The topic of the article is the Norwegian expansion within oil tanker shipping in the interwar period, which is analysed on the basis of new empirical evidence. By means of a purpose-built database, the basis for the expansion is analysed and traditional accounts of the growth of Norwegian tanker shipping are challenged and modified. Previously, the purchase of second-hand tankers from Anglo-Saxon Petroleum Co. has been seen as the most important basis for the growth of Norwegian tanker shipping. This article claims that the Anglo-Saxon tankers were relatively unimportant. The dynamic relationship between Oslo-based shipowners, primarily companies without previous experience from the tanker industry, and foreign, in particular Swedish, yards is the key to understanding the development.
Introduction
The development of Norwegian shipping in the interwar period is a textbook example of a country going against the grain, finding profitable niches in a depressed market. The world shipping industry was characterised by crisis in the interwar era. Yet, Norwegian shipowners used this difficult period to modernise their fleets, particularly through investments in tankers, and reclaim their position in international shipping.
The tanker fleet growth has not been neglected in the literature, but holds an important position in general studies of Norwegian shipping by domestic as well as international authors. 1 For instance, the Norwegian owners' eagerness to buy tankers provides the contrast to the reluctance of UK owners in Sturmey's seminal book on British shipping. 2 The topic has also been the main subject of a few more detailed studies. 3 However, the analyses tend to refer to "impressionistic" explanations. In particular, the purchase of second-hand tonnage from British oil companies and the increased investments in tankers in Oslo in the 1930s have been emphasised. Quantitative analyses have been strangely absent. This article attempts to remedy this problem.
The article consists of three parts. After a brief presentation of the atypical development of Norway's shipping industry, the most dynamic part of the sector -the tanker market -is analysed. I have constructed a database of all Norwegian tankers and tanker owners in the period 1919-39. The database makes it possible to examine various aspects of the Norwegian foray into tankers. When the new results are compared with traditional accounts of the interwar tanker expansion, a number of differences appear. As such, the empirical analysis can be used to modify previous presentations. Finally, the findings from the database are used to (re)evaluate the basis for the growth of the Norwegian tanker fleet in the interwar period. In particular, the apparently important relationship between Norwegian owners and Swedish yards is investigated. -2 -
The Background -Expansion in a Depressed Market
During the interwar period -and particularly in the years from 1929 to 1939 -the Norwegian share of the world fleet increased in a generally difficult shipping market. By 1939 four related elements set Norwegian shipowners apart from most of their international competitors: the rapid fleet growth over the last decade, the high shares of tankers and motor vessels, as well as the relatively modern fleet. 4 Table 1 illustrates that there were substantial differences between the structure of the Norwegian fleet and the fleets of other countries by the end of the interwar period. In the latter period the Norwegian tonnage increased by more than 50 per cent, whereas the rest of the world fleet actually declined. 5 The driving force behind the Norwegian increase was the tanker fleet, which doubled between 1929 and 1939.
The Premise -Oil Company Outsourcing
As the demand for shipping services is a derivative of the volume of international trade, much of the interwar period was characterised by a depressed shipping market. However, some segments showed considerable growth. In his analysis of the shipping market, Sturmey emphasises that "[t]he most important change in world trading patterns in the interwar years was the decline in the relative importance of the coal trade and the growth in the trade of oil with a conseque nt need for specialized tankers to transport the oil." 6 Moreover, in addition to growing faster than other shipping segments, the tanker market was influenced by the international oil companies' decision to outsource parts of their transport needs.
The Norwegian entry into tanker transports would not have been possible to the same extent without this fundamental shift in the oil companies' strategies. Many oil companies chose to offload debts by selling ships to independent owners, at the same time taking the tonnage back on long-term charters. By slicing up the value chain in this manner, and leaving more of the petroleum transport to outsiders, the oil companies managed to free financial resources for their core activities. 
Tanker Shipping -An Opportunity Eagerly E mbraced
In the interwar period Norwegian shipowners expanded in a number of segments, including liner shipping, transport of refrigerated products and whaling. Yet, tanker shipping is the segment in which the success was most pronounced. Nevertheless, due to the strong decline of other major shipping nations, the Norwegian share of the world fleet increased even if the tanker segment is excluded. In order to create a solid empirical basis for the analysis the There seems to be no uniform reason for the pioneers' lack of enthusiasm after the initial investments. Two of the companies increased their fleets in the period 1919-1924. for new ent rants, and there was no lack of takers. However, it is not obvious where we should look for the sources of fleet growth in this second wave of expansion in Norwegian tanker shipping.
The Overrated Anglo-Saxon "Breakthrough"
Traditional The Swedish invasion is evident if we decompose the data in Figure 3 and The ten yards included in Figure 4 had built more than four fifths of all the tanker tonnage registered in Norway in 1939. The basis for the Swedish yards' prominent position may have changed over time. The willingness to grant credits to Norwegian owners was perhaps the most important factor in the early part of the period. Götaverken's credits were initially 50 per cent over five years, but increased to 70 per cent, parallel with an increase in the repayment period, in the late 1920s. 33 To some extent, access to credit could outweigh lack of competitiveness. It is symptomatic that one Norwegian shipowner, for whom yard credits was of no importance, refrained from ordering at Götaverken; "The problem [...] was that the company had an extraordinarily good financial position and that this company could not be 32 Luckily for the Swedish yards, the ability to fully finance ships by means of the company's own coffers was relatively rare among the companies that invested heavily in tankers. Moreover, the Swedish yards' competitiveness apparently improved during the 1930s. Olsson has compared two sets of contracts for similar tankers. 35 In 1928 the two Swedish yards had costs which were three and 13 per cent higher than the Dutch yard included in the comparison. In 1935 the Swedish price was 20 per cent lower than the Dutch price. 36 This does not mean that the subsidy-element contained in the yard credits became unimportant, but indicates that the growing Swedish market share was to a larger extent related to their ability to deliver the tonnage wanted by Norwegian owners at reasonable prices, as well as the sclerosis that affected the ir main potential competitors -the UK yards. 37 Lorenz and Dunn both emphasise the effects of standardisation when discussing the relationship between Swedish yards and Norwegian owners. 38 Studies of the Swedish yard industry do not show that production of long series of ships increased productivity. 39 Nevertheless, the strong focus on the up-and-coming technology, ie the motor ship, coupled with general productivity improvements and a beneficial credit regime undoubtedly made Swedish yards attractive.
There was an obvious symbiosis between the Swedish yards and the Norwegian owners. More than fifty per cent of the value of Götaverken's contracts in the period 1925-36 was related to Norwegian shipowners -and more than a third to Norwegian tanker orders. In fact, Norway represented more than 87 per cent of the value of Götaverken's tanker contracts and more than 76 per cent in the case of Eriksberg and Kockums. 40 Motor ships built for Norwegian owners accounted for almost three quarters of the value of the exports of the Swedish shipbuilding industry between 1920 and 1939. 41 
Newcomers, Established Owners and the Swedish Connection
In most instances there are no substantial variations between newcomers and established tanker owners with regard to the countries in which they built their ships. For the 1939 fleets, there are only minor variations for Denmark, Germany and the UK. 45 The Netherlands, on the other hand, had built more than eight per cent of the established owners' tonnage, but only 1.6 per cent of the newcomers' ships. 46 The major difference, however, is Sweden. By 1939 more than 34 per cent of the newcomers' fleets had been built in Sweden, compared with less than 18 per cent of the established owners' fleets.
It is evident that the Swedish yards were particularly important for the growth of the Norwegian newcomers. The data in Table 4 is an attempt at gauging the relationship between the three most important Swedish yards and the different types of Norwegian owners. The 45 The newcomers' and the established owners' shares of ships built in these countries are practically equal. 46 Other exceptions are Danzig (three vessels) and France (two vessels), which had only built for established owners, as well as Italy (one vessel) and Norway (four vessels), which had only delivered to newcomers. Given the focus on the relationship between the newcomers and Götaverken, it is surprising that the yard, at least in relative terms, seems to have been more important for established tanker owners than for the companies that did not own tankers in 1927. 47 There are three reasons to be cautious about interpreting 
Concluding remarks
The previous analysis has shown that the purchase of Anglo-Saxon tankers has been given undue credit in explanations of the initial expansion of the Norwegian tanker fleet. The article also shows that the main impetus came from other newcomers in the tanker market -in particular Oslo-based companies.
The Norwegian interwar tanker expansion can be explained by three elements. One reason was of course the growth of oil transports and the oil companies' decision to leave parts of their transport needs to outsiders. The second crucial element was the dynamic nature of Norwegian shipping companies, and in particular the newcomers that emerged as tanker owners in this period. The final element was the generous financial arrangements that were available for the construction of new tankers.
The first element, oil company outsourcing, was a necessary condition for the emergence of an independent tanker fleets. Why did Norwegian shipowners, to a much larger extent than shipping companies in other countries, take advantage of this opportunity? It is evident that this question definitely deserves more detailed research. The analysis in this article nevertheless suggests a starting point -size. Most of the Norwegian shipping companies that entered the tanker sector in the late 1920s and early 1930s were relatively small. 48 On the one hand, this meant that their organisations were modest and nonbureaucratic. On the other hand, it implied that they had limited resources.
The need for large, land-based organisations was considerably smaller in the tanker 48 The extreme example of a small and dynamic organisation is AS Moltzaus Tankrederi, which began its operation in a corner of the shipping company Ivar-An Christensen's waiting room; see Fasting, Kaare, AS Moltzaus Tankrederi. Oslo: AS Moltzaus Tankrederi, 1955, 27. sector than in other shipping segments. The tanker sector thus represented a new opportunity for small companies; "Scand inavian owners […] were not inhibited by traditional attitudes and were more flexible and enterprising in seeking new trades and in adapting their shipping enterprises to seize opportunities." 49 The organisations were well-suited to take on the limited tasks related to tanker operation and ownership. The question is then how the financial side of the investment could be arranged. Yard credits neutralised this problem; "It would seem that shipbuilders to-day to be successful in obtaining orders for the construction of vessels must be financiers rather than builders, as the cost of construction does not count as much as the arranging of the finance for the owner." 50 The fact that the lenders bore a substantial part of the financial risk must have been particularly attractive for Norwegian newcomers with little to lose.
The increasingly important role of the Swedish yards can be explained by the combination of the willingness to extend credits, up-to-date technology and improving competitiveness. The UK shipyards, having failed to keep up with the main developments of the industry, were in decline. Moreover, the low productivity and dispersed nature of the Norwegian shipbuilding industry meant that domestic yards could not really be contenders.
The Swedish yards could therefore target Norwegian customers, and in fact saw Norway as their "home market". 51 Perhaps Norway's interwar tanker expansion should be seen as a joint Scandinavian effort, where Sweden contributed shipbuilding capacity and financial muscle, while Norway provided maritime knowledge and enterprise. 49 Sturmey, British Shipping, 94. 50 Fairplay, January 8, 1931, 108. 51 Olsson, Svensk Varvsindustri, 126-130.
